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Abstract
We explore the problem of selectively forgetting a par-
ticular subset of the data used for training a deep neural
network. While the effects of the data to be forgotten can
be hidden from the output of the network, insights may still
be gleaned by probing deep into its weights. We propose
a method for “scrubbing” the weights clean of information
about a particular set of training data. The method does not
require retraining from scratch, nor access to the data orig-
inally used for training. Instead, the weights are modified
so that any probing function of the weights, computed with
no knowledge of the random seed used for training, is indis-
tinguishable from the same function applied to the weights
of a network trained without the data to be forgotten. This
condition is a generalized and weaker form of Differential
Privacy. Exploiting ideas related to the stability of stochas-
tic gradient descent, we introduce an upper-bound on the
amount of information remaining in the weights, which can
be estimated efficiently even for deep neural networks.
1. Introduction
Say you are the number ‘6’ in the MNIST handwritten
digit database. You are proud of having nurtured the de-
velopment of convolutional neural networks and their many
beneficial uses. But you are beginning to feel uncomfort-
able with the attention surrounding the new “AI Revolu-
tion,” and long to not be recognized everywhere you ap-
pear. You wish a service existed, like that offered by the
firm Lacuna INC in the screenplay The Eternal Sunshine of
the Spotless Mind, whereby you could submit your images
to have your identity scrubbed clean from handwritten digit
recognition systems. Before you, the number ‘9’ already
demanded that digit recognition systems returned, instead
of a ten-dimensional “pre-softmax” vector (meant to ap-
proximate the log-likelihood of an image containing a num-
ber from 0 to 9) a nine-dimensional vector that excluded the
number ‘9’. So now, every image showing ‘9’ yields an out-
come at random between 0 and 8. Is this enough? It could
be that the system still contains information about the num-
ber ’9,’ and just suppresses it in the output. How do you
know that the system has truly forgotten about you, even
inside the black box? Is it possible to scrub the system so
clean that it behaves as if it had never seen an image of you?
Is it possible to do so without sabotaging information about
other digits, who wish to continue enjoying their celebrity
status? In the next section we formalize these questions to
address the problem of selective forgetting in deep neural
networks (DNNs). Before doing so, we present a summary
of our contributions in the context of related work.
1.1. Related Work
Tampering with a learned model to achieve, or avoid,
forgetting pertains to the general field of life-long learning.
Specifically for the case of deep learning and representation
learning, this topic has algorithmic, architectural and mod-
eling ramifications, which we address in order.
Differential privacy [5] focuses on guaranteeing that
the parameters of a trained model do not leak information
about any particular individual. While this may be relevant
in some applications, the condition is often too difficult to
enforce in deep learning (although see [1]), and not always
necessary. It requires the possible distribution of weights,
given the dataset, P (w|D) to remain almost unchanged af-
ter replacing a sample. Our definition of selective forget-
ting can be seen as a generalization of differential privacy.
In particular, we do not require that information about any
sample in the dataset is minimized, but rather about a partic-
ular subsetDf selected by the user. Moreover, we can apply
a “scrubbing” function S(w) that can perturb the weights
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in order to remove information, so that P (S(w)|D), rather
than P (w|D), needs to remain unchanged. This less restric-
tive setting allows us to train standard deep neural networks
using stochastic gradient descent (SGD), while still being
able to ensure forgetting.
Deep Neural Networks can memorize details about par-
ticular instances, rather than only shared characteristics
[24, 3]. This makes forgetting critical, as attackers can try to
extract information from the weights of the model. Mem-
bership attacks [23, 10, 19, 9, 21] attempt to determine
whether a particular cohort of data was used for training,
without any constructive indication on how to actively for-
get it. They relate to the ability of recovering data from
the model [7] which exploits the increased confidence of
the model on the training data to reconstruct images used
for training; [18] proposes a method for performing zero-
shot knowledge distillation by generating data impressions
from the parameters of the teacher model to train the stu-
dent model. [20] proposes a definition of forgetting based
on changes of the value of the loss function. We show that
this is not meaningful forgetting, and in some cases it may
lead to the (opposite) “Streisand effect,” where the sample
to be forgotten is actually made more noticeable.
Stability of SGD. In [8], a bound is derived on the di-
vergence of training path of models trained with the same
random seed (i.e., same initialization and sampling order)
on datasets that differ by one sample (the “stability” of the
training path). This can be considered as a measure of mem-
orization of a sample and, thus, used to bound the general-
ization error. While these bounds are often loose, we intro-
duce a novel bound on the residual information about a set
of samples to be forgotten, which exploits ideas from both
the stability bounds and the PAC-Bayes bounds [17], which
have been successful even for DNNs [6].
The term “forgetting” is also used frequently in life-long
learning, but often with different connotations that in our
work: Catastrophic forgetting, where a network trained on
a task rapidly loses accuracy on that task when fine-tuned
for another. But while the network can forget a task, the
information on the data it used may still be accessible from
the weights. Hence, even catastrophic forgetting does not
satisfy our stronger definition. Interestingly, however, our
proposed solution for forgetting relates to techniques used
to avoid forgetting: [12] suggests adding an L2 regularizer
using the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) of the task. We
use the FIM, restricted to the samples we wish to retain, to
compute the optimal noise to destroy information, so that
a cohort can be forgotten while maintaining good accuracy
for the remaining samples. Part of our forgetting algorithm
can be interpreted as performing “optimal brain damage”
[14] in order to remove information from the weights if it is
useful only or mainly to the class to be forgotten.
In this paper we talk about the weights of a network as
containing “information,”, even though we have one set of
weights whereas information is commonly defined only for
random variables. While this has caused some confusion
in the literature, the issue has been recently formalized by
[2]. Thus, we will use the term “information” liberally even
when talking about a particular set of weights and dataset.
In defining forgetting, we wish to be resistant to both
“black-box” attacks, which only have access to the model
output through some function (API), and “white-box” at-
tacks, where the attacker can additionally access the model
weights. Since at this point it is unclear how much infor-
mation about a model can be recovered by looking only at
its inputs and outputs, to avoid unforeseen weaknesses we
characterize forgetting for the stronger case of white-box
attacks, and derive bounds and defense mechanism for it.
1.2. Contributions
In summary, our contributions are, first, to propose a
definition of selective forgetting for trained neural net-
work models. It is not as simple as obfuscating the acti-
vations, and not as restrictive as Differential Privacy. Sec-
ond, we propose a scrubbing procedure that removes in-
formation from the trained weights, without the need to
access the original training data, nor to re-train the entire
network. We compare the scrubbed network to the gold-
standard model(s) trained from scratch without any knowl-
edge of the data to be forgotten. We also prove the optimal-
ity of this procedure in the quadratic case. The approach is
applicable to both the case where an entire class needs to
be forgotten (e.g. the number ‘6’) or multiple classes (e.g.,
all odd numbers), or a particular subset of samples within
a class, while still maintaining output knowledge of that
class. Our approach is applicable to networks pre-trained
using standard loss functions, such as cross-entropy, unlike
Differential Privacy methods that require the training to be
conducted in a special manner. Third, we introduce a com-
putable upper bound to the amount of the retained infor-
mation, which can be efficiently computed even for DNNs.
We further characterize the optimal tradeoff with preserv-
ing complementary information. We illustrate the criteria
using the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, in addition to a
new dataset called “Lacuna.”
1.3. Preliminaries and Notation
LetD = {xi, yi}Ni=1 be a dataset of images xi, each with
an associated label yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} representing a class (or
label, or identity). We assume that (xi, yi) ∼ P (x, y) are
drawn from an unknown distribution P .
Let Df ⊂ D be a subset of the data (cohort), whose in-
formation we want to remove (scrub) from a trained model,
and let its complement Dr := D{f be the data that we want
to retain. The data to forget Df can be any subset of D,
but we are especially interested in the case where Df con-
sists of all the data with a given label k (that is, we want to
completely forget about a class), or a subset of a class.
Let φw(·) ∈ RK be a parametric function (model), for
instance a DNN, with parameters w (weights) trained using
D so that the k-th component of the vector φw in response
to an image x approximates the optimal discriminant (log-
posterior), φw(x)k ' logP (y = k|x), up to a normalizing
constant.
1.4. Training algorithm and distribution of weights
Given a dataset D, we can train a model — or equiva-
lently a set of weights — w using some training algorithm
A, that is w = A(D), where A(D) can be a stochastic
function corresponding to stochastic algorithm, for exam-
ple stochastic gradient descent (SGD), where P (w|D) is a
distribution of weights, or a deterministic function, where
P (w|D) is a degenerate (Dirac delta) distribution. In gen-
eral we will consider S(w), the scrubbing function, to also
be stochastic. For instance, it may add noise to the weights
to destroy information. Putting it all together, P (S(w)|D)
is the distribution of possible outcomes after training on the
dataset D and thence forgetting.
2. Definition and Testing of Forgetting
Let φw be a model trained on a dataset D = Df unionsq Dr
Then, a forgetting (or “scrubbing”) procedure consists in
applying a function S(w;Df ) to the weights, with the goal
of forgetting, that is to ensure that an “attacker” (algorithm)
in possession of the model φw cannot compute some “read-
out function” f(w), to reconstruct information about Df .
It should be noted that one can always infer some prop-
erties ofDf , even without having ever seen it. For example,
if D consists of images of faces, we can infer that images
in Df are likely to display two eyes, even without looking
at the model w. What matters for forgetting is the amount
of additional information f(w) can extract from a cohort
Df by exploiting the weights w, that could not have been
inferred simply by its complement Dr. This can be formal-
ized as follows:
Definition 1. Given a readout function f , an optimal scrub-
bing function for f is a function S(w;Df ) — or S(w), omit-
ting the argument Df — such that there is another function
S0(w) that does not depend on Df 1 for which:
KL
(
P (f(S(w))|D) ‖P (f(S0(w))|Dr)
)
= 0. (1)
where KL
(
p(x) ‖ q(x)) = Ep(x)[ log(p(x)/q(x))].2
Satisfying the condition above is trivial by itself (e.g., by
choosing S(w) = S0(w) = c to be constant). The point
1 If S0 could depend on Df , we could for example choose S(w) = w
and S0(w) to discard w and train from scratch onDf — that is S0(w) =
w′ with w′ ∼ p(w|D). This brings the KL to zero, but does not scrub any
information (since S(w) is just the identity).
2Recall KL
(
p(x) ‖ q(x)) ≥ 0 and zero if and only if p(x) = q(x).
is to do so while retaining as much information as possi-
ble about Dr, as we will see later when we introduce the
Forgetting Lagrangian in Equation (3). Concerning resid-
ual information about Df , the formal connection between
the KL-divergence above and the amount of Shannon In-
formation that can be extracted is given by the following:
Proposition 1. Let Y be an attribute of interest that depends
onDf , considered as a random variable (for instance, by re-
sampling the subset from the same class distribution). Then,
I(Y ; f(w)) ≤ EDf [KL
(
P (f(S(w))|D) ‖P (f(S0(w))|Dr)
)
],
where I(x; y) = Ex
[
KL
(
p(y|x) ‖ p(y))] is the Mutual In-
formation between x and y.
Another interpretation of (1) arises from noticing that, if
that quantity is zero then, given the output of the readout
function f(w), we cannot predict with better-than-chance
accuracy whether the model w′ = S(w) was trained with or
without the data. In other words, after forgetting, member-
ship attacks will fail.
In general, we may not know what readout function a
potential attacker will use, and hence we want to be robust
to every f(w). The following lemma is useful to this effect:
Lemma 1. For any function f(w) we have
KL
(
P (f(S(w))|D) ‖P (f(S0(w))|Dr)
)
≤ KL (P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)),
Therefore, we can then focus on minimizing
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
)
, (2)
which guarantees robustness to any readout function. For
the sake of concreteness, we give a first simple example of
a possible scrubbing procedure.
Example 1 (Forgetting by adding noise). Assume the
weights w of the model are bounded. Let S(w) = w + σn,
where n ∼ N (0, I), be a scrubbing procedure that adds a
sample from a Gaussian random variable. Then, as the vari-
ance increases, we have
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
) σ→∞−−−−→ 0.
While adding noise with a large variance does indeed
help forgetting, it throws away the baby along with the bath
water, rendering the model useless. Instead, we want to
forget as much as possible about a cohort while retaining
information about its complement. This can be formalized
by minimizing the Forgetting Lagrangian:
L = ES(w)
[
LDr (w)
]
+λKL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
)
.
(3)
Optimizing the first term, say the cross-entropy loss, on the
data to be remembered, is relatively easy. The problem
is doing so while also minimizing the second (forgetting)
term: For a DNN, the distribution P (w|D) of possible out-
comes of the training process is complex and unlikely to
be captured with enough precision to estimate the KL di-
vergence above. Nonetheless, the Forgetting Lagrangian, if
optimized, captures the notion of selective forgetting at the
core of our paper.
2.1. Stability and Local Forgetting Bound
We generally assume that the cohort to be forgotten,
Df , is a small portion of the overall dataset D, lest one is
better-off re-training than forgetting. We also assume that
the training process w = A(D), or w = A(D, ), if it is
stochastic, for some deterministic function A and a random
seed  ∼ N (0, I), is stable, i.e. if D and D′ differ by a few
samples, then the outcome of training A(D, ) is close to
A(D′, ). Under stable training, we expect the two distribu-
tions P (S(w)|D) and P (S0(w)|Dr) to be close.
We now show how we can exploit the stability of the
learning algorithm to bound the Forgetting Lagrangian.
Proposition 2 (Local Forgetting Bound). Let A(D, ) be
a training algorithm with random seed  ∼ P (). Notice
that in this case P (S(w)|D) = E[P (S(w)|D, )]. We then
have the bound:
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
) ≤
E
[
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr, )
)]
In the local forgetting bound we do not look at the global
distribution of possible outcomes as the random seed varies,
but only at the average of forgetting using a particular ran-
dom seed. To see the value of this bound, consider the fol-
lowing example.
Example 2 (Gaussian forgetting). Consider the case where
S(w) = h(w) + n and S0(w) = w + n′, with n, n′ ∼
N (0,Σ) is Gaussian noise. Since for a fixed random seed
 the weights w = A(D, ) are a deterministic function of
the data, we simply have P (S(w)|D, ) = N (A(D, ),Σ)
and similarly P (S0(w)|Dr, ) = N (A(Dr, ),Σ). Using
the previous bound, we have:
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
) ≤
1
2
E
[
(h(w)− w′)TΣ−1(h(w)− w′)
]
(4)
where w = A(D, ) and w′ = A(Dr, ).
That is, we can upper-bound the complex term
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
)
with a much simpler one
obtained by averaging the results of training with different
random seeds.
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Figure 1. (Top) Distributions of weights P (w|D) and P (w|Dr)
before and after the scrubbing procedure is applied to forget the
samples Df . The scrubbing procedure makes the two distribu-
tions indistinguishable, thus preventing an attacker from extract-
ing any information about Df . The KL divergence measures the
maximum amount of information that an attacker can extract. Af-
ter forgetting, less than 1 NAT of information about the cohort
Df is accessible. (Bottom) The effect of the scrubbing procedure
on the distribution of possible classification boundaries obtained
after training. After forgetting the subject on the top left blue clus-
ter, the classification boundaries adjust as if she never existed, and
the distribution mimics the one that would have been obtained by
training from scratch without that data.
Moreover, this suggests three simple but general proce-
dures to forget. Under the stability assumption, we can ei-
ther (i) apply a function h(w) that bring w and w′ closer to-
gether (i.e., minimize h(w)−w′ in eq. (4)), or (ii) add noise
whose covariance Σ is high in the direction h(w) − w′, or
(iii) both. Indeed, this will be the basis of our forgetting
algorithm, which we describe next.
3. Optimal Quadratic Scrubbing Algorithm
In this section, we derive an optimal scrubbing algorithm
under a local quadratic approximation. We then validate the
method empirically in complex real world problems where
the assumptions are violated. We start with strong assump-
tions, namely that the loss is quadratic and optimized using
a continuous gradient flow. That is, gradient descent is per-
formed with an infinitesimal learning rate. We will relax
these assumptions later.
Proposition 3 (Optimal quadratic scrubbing algorithm).
Let the loss be LD(w) = LDf (w) + LDr (w), and assume
both LD(w) and LDr (w) are quadratic. Assume that the
optimization algorithm At(D, ) at time t is given by the
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Figure 2. Trade-off between information remaining about the class
to forget and test error, mediated by the parameter λ in the La-
grangian: We can always forget more, but this comes at the cost of
decreased accuracy.
gradient flow of the loss with a random initialization, and
let h(w) be the function
h(w) = e−BteAtd+ e−Bt(d− dr)− dr,
where A = ∇2LD(w), B = ∇2LDr (w), d = A−1∇wLD
and dr = B−1∇wLDr . Then, h(w) is such that
h(At(D, )) = At(Dr, ) for all random initializations 
and all times t. In particular, S(w) = w + h(w) scrubs the
model clean of all information in Df :
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (w|Dr, )
)
= 0
When t→∞, this reduces to the Newton update:
S∞(w) = w −B−1∇LDr (w).
Note that we do not need to assume that the optimization
algorithm is close to convergence to prove the above result.
3.1. Robust Scrubbing
Proposition 3 requires the loss to be quadratic, which is
typically not the case. Even if it was, practical optimiza-
tion proceeds in discrete steps, not as a gradient flow. To
relax these assumptions, we exploit the remaining degree of
freedom in Example 2, which is the noise.
Proposition 4 (Robust scrubbing procedure). Assume that
h(w) is close to w′ up to some normally distributed error
h(w) − w′ ∼ N(0,Σh), and assume that LDr (w) is (lo-
cally) quadratic around h(w). Then the optimal scrubbing
procedure in the form S(w) = h(w)+n, with n ∼ N(0,Σ),
that minimizes the Forgetting Lagrangian
L = ES(w)[LDr (w)]+
λE
[
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr, )
)]
is obtained when ΣBΣ = λΣh, where B = ∇2LDr (k).
In particular, if the error is isotropic, that is Σh = σ2hI is a
multiple of the identity, we have Σ =
√
λσ2hB
−1/2.
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Figure 3. Filters of a network trained with the same random seed,
with and without 5’s. Some filters specialize to be 5-specific (filter
A), and differ between the two networks, while others are not 5-
specific (filter B), and remain identical. The scrubbing procedure
brings original and target network closer by destroying 5-specific
filters, effectively removing information about 5’s.
Putting this together with the result in Proposition 3 gives
us the following robust scrubbing procedure:
St(w) = w + e
−BteAtd+ e−Bt(d− dr)− dr
+ (λσ2h)
1
4B−1/4, (5)
where  ∼ N(0, I) and B, d and dr are as in Proposi-
tion 3. In Figure 1 we show the effect of the scrubbing
procedure on a simple logistic regression problem (which
is not quadratic) trained with SGD (which does not satisfy
the gradient flow assumption). Nonetheless, the scrubbing
procedure manages to bring the value of the KL divergence
close to zero. Finally, when t → ∞ (i.e., the optimization
is near convergence), this simplifies to the noisy Newton
update which can be more readily applied:
St(w) = w −B−1∇LDr (w) + (λσ2h)
1
4B−1/4. (6)
Here λ is a hyperparameter that trades off residual infor-
mation about the data to be forgotten, and damage to the
information to be retained. The hyperparameter σh weights
the error in approximating the gradient flow.
3.2. Forgetting using a subset of the data
Once a model is trained, a request to forget Df may be
initiated by providing that cohort, as in the fictional ser-
vice of Lacuna INC, but in general one may no longer have
available the remainder of the dataset used for training, Dr.
However, assuming we are at a minimum of LD(w), we
have ∇LD(w) = 0. Hence, we can rewrite ∇LDr (w) =
−∇LDf (w) and ∇2LDr (w) = ∇2LD(w) − ∇2LDr (w).
Using these identities, instead of recomputing the gradients
and Hessian on the whole dataset, we can simply use those
computed on the cohort to be forgotten, provided we cached
the Hessian∇2LD(w) we obtained at the end of the training
on the original datasetD. Note that this is not a requirement,
although recommended in case the data to be remembered
is no longer available.
3.3. Hessian approximation and Fisher Information
In practice, the Hessian is too expensive to compute for
a DNN. In general, we cannot even ensure it is positive
definite. To address both issues, we use the Levenberg-
Marquardt semi-positive-definite approximation:
∇2LD(w) ' Ex∼DEy∼p(y|x)[∇w`w(x, y)∇w`w(x, y)T ].
(7)
Note that for some loss functions, including most used in
machine learning, this approximation of the Hessian coin-
cides with the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) [15], which
opens the door to information-theoretic interpretations of
the scrubbing procedure. Moreover, the approximation of
the Hessian with the FIM is exact for some problems, such
as linear regression and linear logistic regression.
4. Deep Network Scrubbing
We now relax the forgetting procedure eq. (6) to deep
networks, that violate the assumptions used in deriving it.
We present two variants, one uses the FIM of the network.
However, since this depends on the network gradients, it
may not be robust when the loss landscape is highly irreg-
ular. To solve this, we present a more robust method that
attempts to minimize directly the Forgetting Lagrangian
eq. (3) through a variational optimization procedure.
4.1. Fisher forgetting
As mentioned above, we approximate the Hessian with
the FIM eq. (7). Since the FIM is too large to store in mem-
ory, we can compute its diagonal, or a better Kronecker-
factorized approximation [16]. In our experiments, we find
that the diagonal is not a good enough approximation of
B for a full Newton step h(w) = w − B−1∇LDr (w) in
eq. (6). However, the diagonal is still a good approximation
for the purpose of adding noise. Therefore, we simplify the
procedure and take h(w) = w, while we still use the ap-
proximation of the FIM as the covariance of the noise. This
results in the simplified scrubbing procedure:
S(w) = w + (λσ2h)
1
4F−1/4,
where F = Ex∼DEy∼p(y|x)[∇wpw(y|x)∇wpw(y|x)T ] is
the FIM computed at the point w. Here λ is a hyper-
parameter that trades off forgetting with the increase in er-
ror, as shown in Figure 2. Notice that, since h(w) = w,
instead of a Newton step, this procedure relies on w and w′
already being close, which hinges on the stability of SGD.
This procedure may be interpreted as adding noise to de-
stroy the weights that may have been informative about Df
but not Dr, as seen in Figure 3.
4.2. Variational forgetting
Rather than using the FIM, we may optimize for the
noise in (a proxy for) the Forgetting Lagrangian eq. (3): Not
knowing the optimal direction w − w′ along which to add
noise (see Example 2), we may add the maximum amount
of noise in all directions, while keeping the increase in the
loss to a minimum. Formally, we minimize the proxy La-
grangian:
L(Σ) = En∼N(0,Σ)
[
LDr (w + n)
]− λ log |Σ|.
The optimal Σ may be seen as the FIM computed over a
smoothed landscape. Since the noise is Gaussian, L(Σ) can
be optimized using the local reparametrization trick [11].
5. Experiments
5.1. Datasets
We report experiments on MNIST, CIFAR10 [13],
Lacuna-10 and Lacuna-100, which we introduce and con-
sist respectively of faces of 10 and 100 different celebrities
from VGGFaces2 [4] (see Appendix for details). On both
CIFAR-10 and Lacuna-10 we choose to forget either an en-
tire class, or a hundred images of the class.
5.2. Models and training
For images (Lacuna-10 and CIFAR10), we use a small
All-CNN (reducing the number of layers) [22], to which we
add batch normalization before each non-linearity. We pre-
train on Lacuna-100/CIFAR-100 for 15 epochs using SGD
with fixed learning rate of 0.1, momentum 0.9 and weight
decay 0.0005. We fine-tune on Lacuna-10/CIFAR-10 with
learning rate 0.01. To simplify the analysis, during fine-
tuning we do not update the running mean and variance of
batch normalization, and rather reuse the pre-trained ones.
5.3. Linear logistic regression
To validate the theory, we first test the scrubbing proce-
dure in eq. (5) on logistic regression, where the task is to
forget data points belonging to one of two clusters compris-
ing the class in Figure 1. We train using a uniform random
initialization for the weights and SGD with batch size 10,
with early stopping after 10 epochs. Since the problem is
low-dimensional, we can easily approximate the distribu-
tion p(w|D) and p(w|Dr) by training 100 times with differ-
ent random seeds.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the scrubbing procedure is
able to align the two distributions with near perfect overlap,
therefore preventing an attacker form extracting any infor-
mation about the forgotten cluster. Notice also that, since
we use early stopping, the algorithm had not yet converged,
and exploiting the time dependency in eq. (5) rather than
using the simpler eq. (6) is critical.
Metrics Original
model
Retrain
(target)
Finetune Negative
gradient
Random
Labels
Hiding Fisher
(ours)
Variational
(ours)
Lacuna-10 Error on Dtest (%) 9.2 10.2 9.0 9.0 12.3 17.2 14.4 14.5
Scrub 100 images Error on Df (%) 0.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 100.0 11 7
All-CNN Error on Dr (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.0 4.4 3.6
Info-bound (NATs) 3193 2042
Lacuna-10 Error on Dtest (%) 9.2 17.8 10.0 17.2 17.5 16.9 20.7 20.3
Forget class Error on Df (%) 0.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 88.9 100 100.0 100.0
All-CNN Error on Dr (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.0
Info-bound (NATs) 10074 8400
CIFAR-10 Error on Dtest (%) 13.0 11.9 11.9 11.8 12.1 19.5 15.63 15.7
Scrub 100 images Error on Df (%) 0.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 100.0 9 5
All-CNN Error on Dr (%) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 4.8 5.07
Info-bound (NATs) 38545 35614
CIFAR-10 Error on Dtest (%) 13.0 20.1 13.1 18.9 19.4 19.5 21.25 21.29
Forget class Error on Df (%) 0.0 100.0 21.0 100.0 96.6 100.0 99.86 100
All-CNN Error on Dr (%) 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.88 2.9
Info-bound (NATs) 383178 353503
Table 1. Original model is the model trained on all data D = Df unionsq Dr . The forgetting algorithm should scrub information from the
weights of this model. Retrain denotes the model obtained by retraining from scratch onDr , without knowledge ofDf . The metric values
in the Retrain column is the optimal value which every other scrubbing procedure should attempt to match. We consider the following
forgetting procedures: Fine-tune denotes fine-tuning the model on Dr . Negative gradient denotes fine-tuning on Df by moving in the
direction of increasing loss. Random label denotes replacing the labels of the class with random labels and then fine-tuning on all D.
Hiding denotes simply removing the class from the final classification layer. Fisher and Variational are our proposed methods, which
add noise to the weights to destroy information aboutDf following the forgetting Lagrangian. We benchmark these methods using several
readout functions: errors on Df and Dr after scrubbing, time to retrain on the forgotten samples after scrubbing, distribution of the model
entropy. In all cases, the read-out of the scrubbed model should be closer to the target retrained model than to the original. Note that our
methods also provide an upper-bound to the amount of information remaining.
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Figure 4. Streisand Effect: Distribution of the entropy of model output (confidence) on: the retain set Dr , the forget set Df , and the
test set. The original model has seen Df , and its prediction on it are very confident (matching the confidence on the train data). On
the other hand, a model re-trained without seeing Df has a lower confidence Df . After applying our scrubbing procedures (Fisher and
Variational) to the original model, the confidence matches more closely the one we would have expected for a model that has never seen
the data (column 3 is more similar to 2 than 1). For an incorrect method of forgetting, like training with random labels, we observe that the
entropy of the forgotten samples is very degenerate and different from what we would have expected if the model had actually never seen
those samples (it is concentrated only around chance level prediction entropy). That is, attempting to remove information about a particular
cohort using this method, may actually end up providing more information about the cohort than the original model.
5.4. Baseline forgetting methods
Together with our proposed methods, we experiment
with four other baselines which may intuitively provide
some degree of forgetting. (i) Fine-tune: we fine-tune the
model on the remaining dataDr using a slightly large learn-
ing rate. This is akin to catastrophic forgetting, where fine-
tuning without Df may make the model forget the origi-
nal solution to Df (more so because of the larger learn-
ing rate). (ii) Negative gradient: we fine-tune on D by
moving in the direction of increasing loss for samples in
Df , which is equivalent to using a negative gradient for the
samples to forget. This aims to damage features predicting
Df correctly. (iii) Random labels: fine-tune the model on
D by randomly resampling labels corresponding to images
belonging to Df , so that those samples will get a random
gradient. (iv) Hiding: we simply remove the row corre-
sponding to the class to forget from the final classification
layer of the DNN.
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Figure 5. Re-learn time (in epochs) for various forgetting meth-
ods. All the baselines method can quickly recover perfect perfor-
mance on Df , suggesting that they do not actually scrub informa-
tion from the weights. On the other hand, the relearn time for our
methods is higher, and closer to the one of a model that has never
seen the data, suggesting that they remove more information.
5.5. Readout functions used
Unlike our methods, these baselines do not come with
an upper bound on the quantity of remaining information.
It is therefore unclear how much information is removed.
For this reason, we introduce the following read-out func-
tions, which may be used to gauge how much information
they were able destroy: (i) Error on the test set Dtest (ide-
ally small), (ii) Error on the cohort to be forgotten Df
(ideally the same as a model trained without seeing Df ),
(iii) Error on the residualDr (ideally small), (iv) Re-learn
time (in epochs) time to retrain the scrubbed model on the
forgotten data (measured by the time for the loss to reach
a fixed threshold, ideally slow). If a scrubbed model can
quickly recover a good accuracy, information about that co-
hort is likely still present in the weights. (v) Model con-
fidence: We plot the distribution of model confidence (en-
tropy of the output prediction) on the retain set Dr, forget
set Df and the test set (should look similar to the confi-
dence of a model that has never seen the data). (vi) Infor-
mation bound: For our methods, we compute the informa-
tion upper-bound about the cohort to be forgotten in NATs
using Proposition 2.
5.6. Results
First, in Table 1 we show the results of scrubbing Df
from model trained on all the data. We test both the case
we want to forget only a subset of 100-images from the
class, and when we want to forget a whole identity. We test
on CIFAR-10 and Lacuna-10 (with a network pretrained on
CIFAR-100 and Lacuna-100 respectively).
Retrain denotes the gold standard which every scrubbing
procedure should attempt to match for the error readout
function. From the case where we want to scrub a subset
(100 samples) of a class (first and third row of Retrain) it is
clear that scrubbing is not merely achieving 100% error on
Df , which can be done in different ways, (Retrain has 17%
and 14% error respectively on Df and not 100%) but rather
it involves scrubbing the information from the weights so
that it behaves identically to a re-trained model. Fine-tuning
on Dr, which in this case is similar to catastrophic forget-
ting, performs poorly on the error readout function (error on
Df andDr), suggesting that using catastrophic forgetting is
the not the correct solution to selective forgetting.
Negative gradient or random labels based methods per-
form well (similar value to Retrain) on the error readout
function, however, when we use the re-learn time as a read-
out function (Figure 5) it becomes clear that very little in-
formation is actually removed. This suggests that merely
scrubbing the activations by hiding or changing some out-
put is not sufficient for selective forgetting; rather, informa-
tion needs to be removed from the weights as anticipated.
Moreover, applying an incorrect scrubbing procedure may
make the images to forget more noticeable to an attacker
(Streisand effect), as we can see by from the confidence val-
ues in Figure 4.
The ease of forgetting a learnt cohort also depends on its
size. In particular, in Figure 7 we observe that, for a fixed
value of λ in eq. (1), the upper-bound on the information
retained by the model after scrubbing increases with the size
of the cohort to forget.
6. Discussion
Our approach is rooted in the connection between Dif-
ferential Privacy (which our framework generalizes) and the
stability of SGD. Forgetting is also intrinsically connected
with information. As we discussed, forgetting may also be
seen as minimizing an upper-bound on the amount of infor-
mation that the weights contain about Df [2] and that an
attacker may extract about that particular cohort Df .
It should be noted, however, that we picked Shannon’s
framework to define information. Forgetting, in this sense,
implies that there is no function that, in expectation, can
extract information relative to some attribute. In particular,
the fact that we do not restrict the class of functions has a
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Figure 6. Difficulty of forgetting increases with cohort size. For
a fixed λ (forgetting parameter), we plot the amount of information
remaining after scrubbing as a function of the cohort size (|Df |).
strong effect. In principle, the readout function f(w) may
be arbitrarily complex, and can have perfect knowledge of
all remaining data Dr and of the training procedure. On
the other hand, most read-out functions used in practice are
generally agnostic to the details of the training process, and
even knowing that perfectly, it is doubtful that an attacker
could model p(w|D) for a deep network well enough to ex-
tract information from it. This suggests that characterizing
viable readout functions f(w) may be a promising area of
research.
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Supplementary Material
A. Additional experiments
In Figure 8 we plot the loss function along a line joining
the original model trained on all data and the ground-truth
optimal model that was trained from the beginning without
seeing the data to forget. The plots confirm that the two
models are close to each other, as expected from the sta-
bility of SGD, and that the loss function in a neighborhood
of the two points is convex (at least on the line joining the
two). This justifies the hypotheses that we made to apply
our forgetting method (derived in the case of a convex loss)
to the more challenging case of deep networks.
To further confirm that our method can be applied to dif-
ferent architectures, in addition to the experiments on All-
CNN that we show in the main paper we run additional ex-
periments on a ResNet-18 architecture. In particular, Ta-
ble 2 show the errors obtained by various forgetting tech-
niques and Figure 10 shows the relearn time for a class af-
ter forgetting. In Figure 9, we show that ResNets too suffer
from a Streisand effect if an improper forgetting procedure
is applied.
B. Implementation details
The term e−BteAt in eq. (5) may diverge for t → ∞ if
the actual dynamics of the optimization algorithm do not ex-
actly satisfy the hypotheses. In practice, we found it useful
to replace it with eclamp(A−B,1/t)t, where clamp(A, 1/t)
clamps the eigenvalues ofA so that they are smaller or equal
to 1/t, so that the expression does not diverge.3 Notice also
that in general e−BteAt 6= e(A−B)t, unless A and B com-
mute, but we found this to be a good approximation in prac-
tice.
For DNNs, we perform experiments on Lacuna-10 and
CIFAR-10 using All-CNN and ResNet. For All-CNN, we
use the model proposed in [22] and for ResNet we use the
ResNet-18 model; however, we reduce the number of filters
by half in each layer and remove the final residual block.
For all the experiments we first pre-train the network on
Lacuna-100 (CIFAR-100), and then fine-tune it on Lacuna-
10 (CIFAR-10). We do not use data augmentation in any
of the experiments. While pre-training the network we use
a constant learning rate of 0.1 and train for 30 epochs and
while finetuning we use a constant learning rate of 0.01 and
train for 50 epochs. In all the experiments we use weight
decay regularization with value 0.0005. We use PyTorch to
perform all the experiments.
In Table 1, ‘Original’ model denotes the case when we
train the model on the entire dataset, D. ‘Retrain’ denotes
the case when we train on Dr (we can do this by simply
3If A = SDST is an eigenvalue decomposition of the symmetric ma-
trix A, we define clamp(A,m) = Smin(D,m)ST .
replacing the corresponding samples from the data loader).
‘Finetune’ is a possible scrubbing procedure when we use
the Original model and fine-tune it on Dr (we can simply
use the data loader from the Retrain case for fine-tuning).
We run fine-tuning for 10 epochs with a learning rate 0.01
and weight decay 0.0005. ‘Negative gradient’ denotes the
case when we fine-tune on the complete data; however, for
the samples belonging to Df we simply multiply the gradi-
ent by −1 (i.e. maximizing the cross-entropy loss for the
samples to forget). To prevent the loss from diverging, we
clamp the maximum loss to chance level. We train for 10
epochs with learning rate 0.01 and weight decay 0.0005.
In ‘Random Labels,’ we randomly shuffle the labels for the
samples we want to forget. We use the same training hyper-
parameters as the previous methods. For ‘Hiding,’ we re-
place the row corresponding to the class of the samples to
be forgotten in the final classifier layer of the DNN with
random initialization. Fisher denotes our method where we
estimate the Fisher noise to add to the model. The Fisher
noise is computed using a positive semi-definite approxima-
tion to the actual Fisher Information Matrix. We compute
the trace of the Fisher Information which can be obtained
by computing the expected outer product of the gradients
of the DNN. In Variational, we compute the optimal noise
to be added for scrubbing a cohort by solving a variational
problem. For Fisher and Variational forgetting we choose
λ = 5 · 10−7.
In order to compute the Information bound (Fisher and
Variational forgetting) we use the Local Forgetting Bound
i.e. we apply the scrubbing procedure to both the origi-
nal and the retrain (target) model and then compute the KL
divergence of the two distributions. We use the same ran-
dom seed while training both the models and use the same
scrubbing procedures for both, that is, S = S0. Fisher and
Variational forgetting method essentially consists of adding
noise to the model weights, i.e., S(w) = w + n where
n ∼ N (0,Σ). Let wo, Σo and wr, Σr denote the weights
and noise covariance for the original and the target retrained
model respectively, then the Information bound is given by
the following relation:
KL
(N (wo,Σo) ‖N (wr,Σr)) =
1
2
(
tr(Σ−1r Σo)+(wr−wo)TΣ−1r (wr−wo)−k+log
|Σr|
|Σo|
)
,
where k is the dimension of w. This bound should be com-
puted for multiple values of the initial random seed and then
averaged to obtain the Local Forgetting Bound in Proposi-
tion 2. In our experiments we compute the bound using a
single random seed.
To compute the Relearn-time we train the scrubbed
model on the datasetD for 50 epochs using a constant learn-
ing rate 0.01. We report the first epoch when the loss value
falls below a certain threshold as the relearn-time.
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Figure 7. Difficulty of forgetting increases with cohort size (for ResNet) We plot the upper-bound on the remaining information (i.e. the
information the model contains about the cohort to forget after scrubbing) as a function of the number of samples to forget for class ’5’ for
different values of λ (Forgetting Lagrangian parameter). Increasing the value of λ decreases the remaining information, but increases the
error on the remaining samples. The number of samples to forget in the plot varies between one sample and the whole class (404 samples).
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Figure 8. Loss landscape of LDr . Plot of loss and error on the dataset Dr of the remaining samples, interpolating along the line joining
the original model (at t = 0) and the (target) retrained model at t = 1. Precisely, let wo be the original model and let wr be the retrained
model, we plot L(w(t)), where w(t) = (1− t) ·wo+ t ·wr by varying t ∈ [−0.5, 2.5]. We observe that the loss along the line joining the
original and the target model is convex, and almost flat throughout. In particular, there exists at least an optimal direction (the one joining
the two models) along which we can add noise without increasing the loss on the remaining data, and which would allow to forget the extra
information. This inspires and justifies our forgetting procedure.
B.1. Pre-training improves the forgetting bound
Our local forgetting bound assumes stability of the algo-
rithm, which may not be guaranteed when training a large
deep network over many epochs. This can be obviated
by pre-training the network, so all paths will start from a
common configuration of weights and training time is de-
creased, and with it the opportunity for paths to diverge. As
we show next, the resulting bound is greatly improved. The
drawback is that the bound cannot guarantee forgetting of
any information contained in the pre-training dataset (that
is, Df needs to be disjoint from Dpretrain).
B.2. Datasets
We report experiments on MNIST, CIFAR10 [13],
Lacuna-10 and Lacuna-100 which we introduce. Lacuna-
10 consists of face images of 10 celebrities from VG-
GFaces2 [4], randomly sampled with at least 500 images
each. We split the data into a test set of 100 samples for each
class, while the remaining form the training set. Similarly,
Lacuna-100 randomly samples 100 celebrities with at least
500 images each. We resize the images to 32x32. There
is no overlap between the two Lacuna datasets. We use
Lacuna-100 to pre-train (and hence assume that we do not
have to forget it), and fine-tune on Lacuna-10. The scrub-
bing procedure is required to forget some or all images for
one identity in Lacuna-10. On both CIFAR-10 and Lacuna-
10 we choose to forget either the entire class ‘5,’ which is
chosen at random, or a hundred images of the class.
C. Proofs
Lemma 1 For any function f(w) have
KL
(
P (f(S(w))|D) ‖P (f(S0(w))|Dr)
)
≤ KL (P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)),
Proof. For simplicity sake, we will consider the random
variables to be discrete. To keep the notation uncluttered,
we consider the expression
KL
(
Q(f(x)) ‖R(f(x))) ≤ KL (Q(x) ‖R(x))
where Q(w) = P (S(w)|D) and R(w) = P (S0(w)|D−k).
Let Wc = {w|f(w) = c}, so that we have Q(f(w) =
c) =
∑
w∈Wc Q(w) and similarly R(f(w) = c) =∑
w∈Wc R(w). Rewriting the LHS with this notation, we
get:
KL
(
Q(f(w)) ‖R(f(w)))
=
∑
c
Q(f(w) = c) log
Q(f(w) = c)
R(f(w) = c)
=
∑
c
Q(f(w) = c) log
∑
w∈Wc Q(w)∑
w∈Wc R(w)
(8)
We can similarly rewrite the RHS:
KL
(
Q(w) ‖R(w)) = ∑
c
∑
w∈Wc
log
Q(w)
R(w)
(9)
From the log-sum inequality, we know that for each c in eq.
(8) and eq. (9):
( ∑
w∈Wc
Q(w)
)
log
∑
w∈Wc Q(w)∑
w∈Wc R(w)
≤
∑
w∈Wc
Q(w) log
Q(w)
R(w)
Summation over all c on both sides of the inequality con-
cludes the proof.
Proposition 2 Let A(D) be a (possibly stochastic) train-
ing algorithm, the outcome of which we indicate as w =
A(D, ) for some deterministic function A and  ∼
N (0, I), for instance a random seed. Then, we have
P (S(w)|D) = E[P (S(w)|D, )]. We have the bound:
KL
(
P (S(w)|D) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr)
) ≤
E
[
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr, )
)]
Proof. To keep the notation uncluttered,we rewrite the in-
equality as:
KL
(
Q(w) ‖R(w)) ≤ E[KL (Q(w|) ‖R(w|))]
where Q(w) = P (S(w)|D) and R(w) = P (S(w)|Dr) The
LHS can be equivalently written as:
KL
(
Q(w) ‖R(w)) =
=
∫
Q(w) log
Q(w)
R(w)
)dw
=
∫
E[Q(w|)] log E[Q(w|)]E[P (w|)]dw
(∗)
≤
∫
E
[
Q(w|) log Q(w|)
P (w|)
]
dw
= E
[ ∫
Q(w|) log Q(w|)
P (w|)dw
]
= E
[
KL
(
Q(w|) ‖R(w|))],
where in (*) we used the log-sum inequality.
Proposition 3 Let the loss be LD(w) = LDf (w) +
LDr (w), and assume both LD(w) and LDr (w) are
quadratic. Assume that the optimization algorithmAt(D, )
at time t is given by the gradient flow of the loss with a ran-
dom initialization, and let h(w) be the function:
h(w) = e−BteAtd+ e−Bt(d− dr)− dr,
where A = ∇2LD(w), B = ∇2LDr (w), d = A−1∇wLD
and dr = B−1∇wLDr , and eAt denotes the matrix expo-
nential. Then h(At(D, )) = At(Dr, ) for all random ini-
tializations  and all times t.
Proof. Since LD and LDr are quadratic, assume without
loss of generality that:
LD(w) =
1
2
(w − w∗A)TA(w − w∗A)
LDf (w) =
1
2
(w − w∗B)TB(w − w∗B)
Since the training dynamic is given by a gradient flow, the
training path is the solution to the differential equation:
w˙A(t) = A(w(t)− w∗A)
w˙B(t) = B(w(t)− w∗B)
which is given respectively by:
wA(t) = w
∗
A + e
−At(w0 − w∗A)
wB(t) = w
∗
B + e
−Bt(w0 − w∗B)
We can compute w0 from the first expression:
w0 = e
At(wA(t)− w∗A) + w∗A = eAtdA + w∗A,
where we defined dA = wA(t) − w∗A =
A−1∇wLD(wA(t)). We now replace this expression
of w0 in the second expression to obtain:
wB(t) = e
−BteAtdA + e−Bt(w∗A − w∗B) + w∗B
= wA(t) + e
−BteAtdA + e−Bt(dB − dA)− dB
where dB := wA(t)− w∗B = B−1∇wLDr (wA(t)).
Proposition 4 Assume that h(w) is close tow′ up to some
normally distributed error h(w) − w′ ∼ N(0,Σh), and
assume that LDr (w) is (locally) quadratic around h(w).
Then the optimal scrubbing procedure in the form S(w) =
h(w) + n, n ∼ N(0,Σ),that minimizes the Forgetting
Lagrangian
L = Ew˜∼S(w)[LDr (w˜)]+
λE
[
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr, )
)]
is obtained when ΣBΣ = λΣh, where B = ∇2LDr (k).
In particular, if the error is isotropic, that is Σh = σ2hI is a
multiple of the identity, we have Σ =
√
λσ2hB
−1/2.
Proof. We consider the following second order approxima-
tion to the loss function in the neighbourhood of the param-
eters at convergence:
Ew˜∼S(w)[LDr (w˜)] = En∼N(0,Σ)[LDr (h(w) + n)]
= En∼N(0,Σ)
[
LDr (h(w)) +
∇LDr (h(w))TΣ
1
2n+
1
2
(Σ
1
2n)TB(Σ
1
2n) + o(n2)
]
' LDr (h(w)) +
1
2
En∼N(0,Σ)
[
(Σ
1
2n)TB(Σ
1
2n)
]
= LDr (h(w)) +
1
2
En∼N(0,Σ)
[
tr(B(Σ
1
2nnTΣ
1
2 ))
]
= LDr (h(w)) +
1
2
tr(BΣ)
Recall that we take S0 to be S0(w) = w + n′ with n′ ∼
N(0,Σ), so that P (S0(w)|Dr, ) ∼ N(w,Σ). Thus, we get
the following expression for the KL divergence term:
E
[
KL
(
P (S(w)|D, ) ‖P (S0(w)|Dr, )
)]
=
1
2
E
[
(h(w)− w′)TΣ−1(h(w)− h(w′))
]
=
1
2
tr(Σ−1Σh),
where in the last equality we have used that by hypothesis
h(w)− w′ ∼ N(0,Σh). Combining the two terms we get:
L = LDr (h(w)) +
1
2
tr(BΣ) +
1
2
tr(Σ−1Σh)
We now want to find the optimal covariance Σ of the noise
to add in order to forget. Setting ∇ΣL = 0, we obtain the
following optimality condition ΣBΣ = λΣh. If we further
assume the error Σh to be isotropic, that is, Σh = σ2hI , then
this condition simplifies to Σ =
√
λσ2hB
−1/2.
Q&A
In this section we address hypothetical questions that our
work may arise, as part of an extended discussion.
1. The bound you provide does not give a provable
guarantee of forgetting.
Proposition 2 gives a computable upper bound on the
residual information on the cohort to be forgotten,
which can be taken as a certificate. This can be used to
design a scrubbing procedure and test its effectiveness.
Only if this is zero, can one have absolute forget-
ting. More in general, depending on the application,
one may be content with some residual information
in exchange for preserving accuracy in the remaining
classes.
Figure 2 visualizes this trade-off, which of course de-
pends on the particular dataset, the particular cohort to
be removed, the particular model used, and algorithm
used to optimize it, etc.
2. Streisand effect: Can you elaborate on how exactly
the experiments show that other methods can lead
to increased exposure?
Streisand effect occurs when an attempt to hide or re-
move information results in an unintentional leakage
of information. In Figure 4, we show such an effect
for deep neural networks when the scrubbing proce-
dure in incorrect, for example, fine-tuning with ran-
dom labels. From Table 1, we observe that random
Metrics Original
model
Retrain
(target)
Finetune Negative
gradient
Random
Labels
Hiding Fisher
(ours)
Variational
(ours)
Lacuna-10 Error on Dtest(%) 11.5 12.1 11.5 11.5 12.3 19.3 13.9 17.8
Scrub 100 images Error on Df (%) 0.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 100.0 18.0 23.0
ResNet Error on Dr(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.0 4.9 8.0
Info-bound (NATs) 1622 1601
Lacuna-10 Error on Dtest(%) 11.5 19.3 11.2 19.2 18.9 19.3 23.0 20.8
Forget class Error on Df (%) 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 94.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
ResNet Error on Dr(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.23 2.72
Info-bound (NATs) 7954 6790
CIFAR-10 Error on Dtest(%) 12.6 12.3 12.6 12.5 12.8 19.6 18.92 18.05
Scrub 100 images Error on Df (%) 0.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 5.0 14.0
ResNet Error on Dr(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 9.2 7.6
Info-bound (NATs) 49489 54101
CIFAR-10 Error on Dtest(%) 12.6 19.1 13.2 19.6 19.4 19.6 24.1 23.81
Forget class Error on Df (%) 0.0 100.0 4.3 100.0 94.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
ResNet Error on Dr(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 7.63 6.05
Info-bound (NATs) 205873 216210
Table 2. Same experiment as Table 1 but with a different architecture: Error readout functions for ResNet trained on Lacuna-10
and CIFAR-10.
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Figure 9. Same plot as in Figure 4 but with a different architecture: Streisand Effect for ResNet model
labels based scrubbing behaves similar to retrain (tar-
get model) method in terms of the error readout func-
tions. Thus, the random labels method attempts to for-
get the cohort Df (as its error values are close to re-
train) however, while doing so the model accidentally
leaks information about the cohort to forget. This can
be seen from the plot of the entropy of the model out-
put on Df (green distribution) for various methods in
Figure 4. For retrain (target model) and Fisher (Varia-
tional) forgetting, we observe that the entropy distribu-
tion onDf are similar. However, for incorrect methods
like random labels we only observe an sharp peak at 0
which is due to the chance level predictions made by
the model for all samples inDf . Thus, an attacker with
access to the forget setDf and an incorrectly scrubbed
model can easily compute the entropy distribution and
identify the cohort to forget Df from the potentially
scrubbed model.
3. You talk about removing information, but infor-
mation is a property of a distribtion, not a value,
whereas a trained network has only one set of
weights. In what sense do you destroy information
about the cohort to be forgotten?
Even though the trained network has a single set of
weights the scrubbing procedure is stochastic, which
gives a distribution of weights. Since in our formu-
lation we apply the scrubbing procedure to both the
original and target model, we get two distributions for
which we can compute the Information Bound using
the Local Forgetting bound from Proposition 2. Note
that even though we obtain a distribution over net-
works after scrubbing, the scrubbed network is a sin-
gle sample from the distribution. In the ideal case,
we want the scrubbing procedure to be such that the
original and target scrubbed distributions coincide i.e.
KL divergence in Proposition 2 (or the remaining in-
formation about Df ) is 0. Since our scrubbing pro-
cedure involves adding noise to the weights of the
network based on the inverse Fisher information, we
can interpret this as adding high noise (destroying fil-
ters which contain information aboutDf ) in directions
along which the loss on Dr remains low.
4. The forgetting procedure you describe is restrited
to neural networks. Does it generalize to other clas-
sifiers? How does it generalize to other tasks, be-
sides classification?
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Figure 10. Same plot as in Figure 5 but with a different architecture: Re-learn time (in epochs) for various forgetting methods
using ResNet model.
The scrubbing procedure presented in the paper can be
applied to any parametric model. The Forgetting La-
grangian is general and makes no assumption about the
model or the task. In the paper, we only present results
for the classification task using DNNs, applying the
scrubbing procedure to other problems will be part of
the future work.
5. How is the optimality proven in the quadratic case
relevant to deep neural networks?
The local forgetting bound allows to compute a valid
certificate of forgetting for any learning problem, con-
vex or not. In Proposition 3 we prove the optimality of
the scrubbing algorithm for a quadratic problem. How-
ever, since DNNs have non-convex loss we relax this
assumption in Proposition 2, where instead we make a
local quadratic assumption for the loss function around
the converged network in order to obtain an approxi-
mate optimal forgetting procedure for DNNs. In Fig-
ure 8, we plot the loss function along the line joining
the original model and the target model. We observe
that the loss function (on the remaining data,Dr) along
the line joining the two networks is convex (almost
flat) and thus there exists an optimal direction along
which we can add noise through the scrubbing proce-
dure without increasing the loss significantly on Dr.
Since we aim to find such a direction to add noise the
local quadratic assumption seems reasonable.
6. Is the dataset Lacuna publicly available?
The original intent of the Lacuna dataset was to re-
produce the narrative of the movie, where two of the
leading actors undergo scrubbing to forget each other.
Since a suitable training set of the lead actors in the
movie was not available in the public domain under
suitable license, we instead downloaded images of dif-
ferent public personas, namely actors and actresses
from the VGGFaces-2 dataset, which is publicly avail-
able. Therefore, Lacuna is just a subset of VGGFaces-
2, with 10 randomly sampled celebrities from the set
of 2,622 identities.
